MORRILL vs. NOYES.

IV. The foregoing imperfect summary of the present legal doctrines upon the question of mental unsoundness in relation to tesmentary capacity, and comparison of the rules of the Courts with
the statements of medical writers, show that the former, in almost
every case, harmonize with the latter as nearly as can be expected,
and as nearly, perhaps, as is possible, in view of the widely differrent functions of the judge and the physician. It is a frequent
subject of complaint among the latter class that the law does not
keep pace with advancing medical science. But, from the necessity of the case, great caution must be observed in admitting a
medical discovery to modify a rule of law. It would be as unwise
to recognise a psychological fact not clearly established, as to
ignore such a fact when settled beyond dispute. The rules of law,
framed to secure justice to the citizen, must be expressed in certain terms and be universal in their application, and cannot always
strictly coincide with the facts of medical experience.
Considered from any point of view, however, the history of the
legal doctrines upon the subject under discussion affords an instance of the living principle animating our law, by which, in its
gradual development, it conforms itself to the progress of knowledge and the wants and necessities of each successive age.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
MORRILL et al. t s. NOYES, REOEIVER, ETC.
The Y. & C. Railroad Company, in 1851, issued bonds for the purpose of fiaishing
their railroad, and secured them by a mortgage, in trust, of their railroad and
franchise, together with all engines and cars then owned, or afterward to be purchased andput upon the ratlroad. In 1858 the companypurchased an engine and
certain cars, which, after being used for some time, they mortgaged to other
parties. In 1859, a bill in equity was commenced by the holders of the bonds,
against the Company and the assignees of the mortgage, to compel them to exe-
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cute the trust. A receiver was appointed by the consent of the parties, who
took all the property from the possession of the mortgagors, to hold the same,
under the direction of the Court, pendente lit. The mortgagees under the second
mortgage thereupon demanded the engine and cars of the receiver, and upon his
refusal to deliver the property, they commenced an action of trover, and obtained
leave of Court to prosecute it.
Upon these facts, it was hed, that as the engine and cars came rightfully into the
possession of the receiver, and had not been sold by him, there had been no
conversion; and even if the property belonged to plaintiffs, they should have
tried tie title by a suit for the possession, and could not maintain an action of
trover.
It was also held, That under theffrst mortgage a lien -was created upon the rolling
stock to be subsequently acquired, which attached as it was afterwards purchased and placed upon the railroad by the mortgagors; and that the second
mortgagees therefore acquired no title which they could maintain against those
holding under the first mortgage.

The facts in this case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the
Court, which was delivered by
DAVIs, J.-This is an action of trover, against the Receiver of
the York and Cumberland Railroad, to recover the value of a
locomotive and several cars. The property in controversy was
purchased in 1853, at different times, and mortgaged to the plaintiffs in December of that year.
Feb. 6, 1851, the Railroad Company mortgaged to John G.
Myers, their railroad, then in process of construction, with all their
real and personal property, franchises, &c., 4c including all cars,
engines, and furniture, that have been, or may be purchased for or
by said company." This mortgage to Myers was in trust, to
secure the payment of bonds to be issued for the purpose of finishing. the construction and equipment of the railroad; and it was
afterwards assigned by Myers, and came into the hands of Churchill
and others, who now hold it, in trust, to secure the bonds issued in
accordance with its provisions. The papers in the equity suit with
which this is connected, show that the mortgage was duly recorded in the registry of deeds for the county, and also in the city
registry of mortgages of personal property.. The copy in this
case has no certificate of registry by the city clerk, but no question is raised by counsel on this point.
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In 1859, certain holders of the bonds commenced a suit in equity
against the company and Churchill, and others who now hold the

mortgage, to compel them to execute the trust created thereby;
and Noyes, the defendant, by consent of the parties, was appointed
a receiver, to take possession of, hold, and manage the entire
property, while the bill should be pending. The engine and cars
in controversy were found by him in possession of the company,
in daily use upon the railroad; and he took possession of them,
with the other property, in March, 1860.
After he had been in possession of the railroad about six months,
the plaintiffs demanded the engine and cars mortgaged to them
in 185 3 *and he refused to deliver them. They thereupon commenced this suit, charging him with a conversion of the property
on the day of the demand, and claiming to recover the value of it
of him, personally.
There is no evidence that they had ever taken the property
into their' actual possession. By their agent, they nominally took
possession of it, while it was in use on the railroad track, in October,
1859. But they did not remove it, or attempt to interfere with
the possession of the company. They left it as it was before; and
they must have known that the company continued to hold and
use it. They must be presumed to have consented to such possession and use. If the company had been strangers, it might have
been otherwise. But so long as the mortgagees of such personal
property leave it in the possession of the mortgagors, without forbidding them to use it, they certainly cannot be trespassers for so
doing.
The counsel for the plaintiffs is undoubtedly correct in saying
that, if a receiver should take possession of property not embraced
in the order by which he is appointed, or in the commission under
which he acts, he would be personally liable to the owner. If he
exceeds the authority conferred upon him, he can show nojustification as an bfficer of the court.
But in the case at bar, the property in controversy was embraced in the receiver's commission. It was in the possession of
the railroad company, and constituted a part of their rolling stock.
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It was mortgaged to the plaintiffs; the right of redemption, unless
the forfeiture had been waived, was lost. But the possession'of
the company was not wrongful. The receiver succeeded to the
rights of the company. As they were not trespassers, he was not.
Nor do the plaintiffs claim that the defendant came wrongfully into the possession of the property, in March, 1860. They
ground their suit upon a subsequent demand made by them, and a
refusal by him to deliver it. They allege in their writ a conversion by such refusal, Sept. 24, 1860.
A receiver is not merely an agent of the complainants, in the
suit under which he is appointed. He represents the court, for
all the parties interested in the property, and acts, instead of the
court, for the benefit of all. He is the servant of the court.
His possession is the possession of the court; and any attempt
to interfere with it, without leave of court, is a contempt. 2
Story's Eq. 829 ; Green vs. Bostwie, 1 Sandf. Ch. 185 ; Angell
vs. Smith, 9 Vesey 335.
It is the duty of the receiver to take possession of the property.
If the person whorhas possession refuses to deliver it up, if he is
a party to the bill, he may be proceeded against for a contempt.
If he is not a party, he inay be made one for that purpose. Or
the receiver, by leave of court, may proceed to recover possession
by a suit at law. Parkervs. Browning, 8 Paige 388; Wynne vs.
ewborough, 3 Bro. Ch. 88 ; Green vs. Winter, 1 Johns. Ch. 60.
After the receiver has taken possession, any person claiming
the property, or any interest therein, may present his claim to the
court. He may be made a party to the suit in order to establish
his claim. Or he may petition to have it heard before a master.
Or he may, by express permission of the court, bring a suit for
the possession, care being taken to protect the receiver. But the
receiver will not be ordered to deliver the property to a claimant
until his right is established, in one of these modes. Nor can any
* claimant bring a suit against the receiver, except by leave of
court, without being liable for a contempt, if the property is a part
of the subject-matter in controversy. 2 Story's Eq. 833; 3
Daniel's Ch 1982; 6 Ves 287; NYoe vs. Gibson, 7 Paige 513; Al-
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bany Bank vs. Schermerhorn, 9 Paige 872 ; Rowell vs. Ripley, 10
Phige 43.
These general principles are decisive of the case before us.
The receiver came rightfully into possession of the property. It
was his duty to retain possession until ordered otherwise by the
court. The plaintiffs had leave to bring this suit, but they chose
the form of their action. They have mistaken their remedy.
Their action is not a suit for the posession, but is an attempt to
hold the receiver personally liable for the value of the property.
Such an action cannot be maintained under the circumstances of
this-ease. Whether in any case an action of trespass or trover can
be maintained against a receiver, when he rightfully takes possession of the property, is a question upon which it is unnecessary for
us to express any opinion. If the property is real estate, so that
the title can be tried in an action of trespass, without changing
such title, or rendering the receiver liable for the value, perhaps
there would be no objection to its maintenance. Or if he has received the rents of real estate, or has sold personal property, by
order of the court, perhaps the amount in his hands may be claimed
in a suit at 'law. But in the case at bar, the plaintiffs, if the
owners, can only recover the possession, in an appropriate action
therefor.
But if, for this reason, the plaintiffs cannot recover in this suit,
still it may be well for us to examine their title to the property, in
order to save further litigation. The question has been fully presented and argued. The plaintiffs claih that the engine and cars
sued for could not have been conveyed by the mortgage to Myers,
of February 6, 1851, because not in existence at the time. They
were not purchased by the railroad company until 1858. As the
mortgage to the plaintiffs was made after the purchase, their title
is good unless the title passed to Myers, in trust, by the fist mortgage.
The question whether a mortgage of personal property not in
existence, or not owned at the time by the.mortgagor, can be made
available by the mortgagee, as a lien upon property afterwards ac-
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quired, has been discussed in many recent cases, with some apparent difference of opinion.
Some of the courts have denied that any difference exists, and
have attempted to reconcile the cases on the ground that such a
mortgage, though void at law, is valid in equity. But this is a
loose use of language, that tends more to confuse than to reconcile. If such a mortgage is absolutely void, for want of any subject-matter to support it, then it should be so held in equity, as well
as at law. But if not thus void, to what extent is it valid ? and in
what sense? It is only by conceding its validity, that it is pertinent to inquire whether the remedy is in equity, or by a suit at
law.
In other cases the reasoning is syllogistic and summary. "Qui
non haset, ille non dat." A mortgage is a grant. Therefore a
mortgage of what one does not own, or of what is not in ease, is
void.
But a mortgage is a grant, to be defeated upon a condition.
This makes it merely the creation of a lien, with certain rights to
secure and enforce it. A lien may be created without a grant.
And sometimes a contract intended as a grant, but ineffectual as
such, will be upheld in equity as a lien. So that the syllogism is by
no means certain to dispose of the question.
As a general proposition it may be said, that a mortgage of such
goods as may be in a store on a future day,-or of such furniture
as may be in a house,-or of such machinery as may be in a mill,or of such stock as may be' on a farm,-when no particular property is referred to, will not convey any title to, or create any lien
upon, such property'subsequently acquired, which can be upheld
or enforced in a suit at law. Read v. Goodwin, 37 Maine 181;
Barnard vs. Eaton, 2 Cush. 294; Codman vs. _reeman, 3 Cush.
806 ; Otis vs. Sill, 8 Barb. 102 ; Gardner vs. MeEwen, 19 N. Y.
(5 Smith) 123 ; Tapfield vs. illman, 46 Eng. 0. L. 243; Lunn vs.
Thornton, 50 Eng. C. L. 379; Gale vs. Burnell, 58 Eng. C. L. 850.
In Connecticut, -a mortgage of a shifting stock of goods in a store,
was held to create the same lien upon goods subsequently purchased
as upon those owned at the time. holly vs. Brown, 14 Conn. 255.
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k. similar decision was made in this State, in the case of Head vs.
aoodwin, 37 Maine 181. But that case was questioned in Jones
es. _ichardson, 10 Met. 481; and it was substantially overruled
in Pratt vs. Chase, 40 Maine 269. The question is therefore no
longer an open one in this court.
It should be noticed, however, that in nearly all the cases cited,
the mortgages were exceedingly indefinite. Some of them described no particular property which could be identified; but they
were mortgages of mere contingencies of such property as the
mortgagors might purchase, if they should purchase any. They
were void for uncertainty, if for no other reason. Winslow vs.
Merchants' Ins. Co., 4 Met. 806. Except the case of Otis vs. Sill
8 Barb. 102, they probably would not have been upheld in equity,
any more than at latb. Mogg vs. Baker, 3 Mees. & Welsb. 195;
Moody vs. Wright, 13 Met. 17.
We can understand these cases better by referring to another
class in which conveyances of property, not in existence at the
time, have been upheld, either at law or in equity. And we think
it will be seen that sales or mortgages of such property have been
sustained when within the following rules.
1. The contract must relate to some particular property described therein, which, though not in existence, must be reasonably
certain to come into existence, so that the minds of the parties may
be in agreement as to what it is to be, and, if the sale is absolute,
what, with reasonable certainty, taking the ordinary contingencies
into consideration, is the present value.
-2. The yendor or mortgagor must have a present, actual interest
in it, or concerning it. As is said in illustrating Rule 14 of
Bacon's Maxims, "the law doth not allow of grants, except there
be the foundation of an interest in the grantor." There must be
something in presenti, of which the thing in futuro is to be -the
product, or with which it is to be connected, as necessary for its
use, or as incident to it, constituting a tangible, existing basis for
the contract.
The application of these principles to the multifarious affairs of
a business people, may sometimes be difficult. And in the various
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enterprises that are likely to be undertaken in a country distinguished for its manufactures, and its domestic and foreign commerce, new applications of them from time to time may be required. But the illustrations to be found in the decided cases
will be sufficient for our present purpose.
Thus, one may sell all the wool which shall grow for a term of
years on sheep owned by him at the time; but not the wool to be
grown on so many sheep, if he does not.own them. Grantham vs.
ffawl ,1Hobart 132; Smith vs. Atkins, 18 Verm. 461. So he may
sell the grass, or any crop that does not require annual renewal,
that shall grow upon hid farm for a term of years. Jencks vs.
Smith, 1 Corns. 90; Bank of Lansingburg vs. Crary, 1 Barb.
542 ; Milliman vs. NZeher, 20 Barb. 87.
If one contracts "forthe construction of a carriage, or a vessel,
for himself, and pays therefor, he acquires no title until it is completed and delivered. Arucklow vs. Mangles, 2 Taunt. 318; Comfort vs. Kierted, 20 Barb. 472. But if he buys a chattel in process of construction, and it is delivered to him, though afterwards
to be finished, the title passes, and the additions made to it for the
purpose of completing it become his property from the time when
they are attached to it. *Theonly reason why the conveyance of a
vessel on the stocks was not upheld as a mortgage, in JBonsey vs.
Amee, 8 Pick. 236, was because there was no delivery, and the
registry law had not then been enacted, which renders a delivery
unnecessary. Call vs. Gray, 37 N. H. 428. A mortgage of unfinished chattels gives the mortgagee a good title to them when
finished. Harding vs. Coburn, 12 Met. 33; Jenckes vs. Goffe,
1 R. I. 511; Perry vs. Pettingill, 83 N. H. 433.
So the owner of a ship may assign the freight of a voyage which
has been commenced. In re ship Ware, 8 Price 269; -Douglas vs.
Ru8sel, I M. & K. (7 Eng. Ch.) 488. Or he may sell the oil
and cargo to be brought home from a whaling voyage then being
prosecuted. Langtonvs. Rorton, 1 Hare 549 ; Fletcher vs. Aforeyo,
2 Story 555. And a laborer, employed by another, may assign his
wages afterwards to be earned; but not unless they are to be
earned under an existing contract. Mulhall vs. Quinn, 1 Gray
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105; Twis8 vs. Cheever, 2 Allen 40; Lannan vs. Smith, T Gray

150.
In the case at bar, the subject-matter of the contract was sufficiently definite and certain; its subsequent existence was reasonably sure; and the mortgagors had an existing interest in, and
title to, the other property then mortgaged, of which this was to
be an essential part, necessary for its use, to be added to it for the
purpose of finishing it. It is entirely unlike the case of a changing stock of goods.
The mortgagors had a charter for a railroad, with all the necessary-franchises and rights for its construction, equipment, and
operation. The .mortgagee had previously contracted to construct
and equip it for the company; and the work had been commenced.
He was to bepaid partly in the bonds of the company, which would
sell in the market. Thereupon they mortgaged to him, and in
trust for the holders of the bonds, their franchise, road, rights of
way, materials, buildings, completed, or in process of construction,
"including all cars, engines, and furniture, that have been or may
be purchased for or by said company," to secure the contract "for
the construction and equipment of said railroad," and to secure
the payment of the bonds to b6 issued to the mortgagee, to him,
"or to his assigns, who shall become the holders of said bonds."
A large part of the numerous railroads in this country have been
constructed by the aid of mortgages, to individuals, or to trustees.
Many of these mortgages, perhaps most of them, embrace, .specifically, engines and cars, to be subsequently acq'uired. As they are
made to secure bonds not to be due for many years, and the rolling
stock is perishable, unless such future acquisitions can be mortgaged, as incident to, and essential to the. use of, the railroad
itself, the security is liable to be greatly diminished. The question is one of great importance in respect to the interests involved
in its determination. ' Nor is it a new one. It has been considered
by several courts of the highest respectability; and such mortgages
have been sustained, not only as to existing property, but as to that
subsequently acquired. Piercevs. Emery, 33 N. H. 484; Seymour
vs. C. & N. F. Railroad Co., 25 Barb. 286; Trust Co. vs. Hren-

MORRILL vs. NOYES.

2T

drickson, 25 Barb. 484; Coe vs. Hart et al., 6 Am. Law Reg. 27;

Pennock vs. (ce, 23 Howard 117; Phillis vs. Winslow, 18 B.
Monroe 581.
In nearly all these cases the question is discussed with much
research and force of reasoning. And, in the absence of contrary
decisions, they constitute a weight of authority not to be disre.
garded, unless it can be clearly shown that they are erroneous.
In some of them, the companies were specially empowered by
legislative acts to mortgage their property and franchies. In the
case of Howe vs. Freeman, 14 Gray 566, such a mortgage was
upheld on the subsequent confirming statute, with an intimation
that otherwise it would have failed. But the general question was
not considered by the Court. Thepower of a corporation, without
any legislative act,' to mortgage itsfranceises with other property,
to secure its liabilities, has never been questioned in this State,
though such mortgages have been common for many years, and
rights under them have been determined in this Court. The weight
of authority in this country is in favor of the doctrine that the
power to mortgage is incident to the rights granted by the act of
incorporation. Even if the franchise to be a corporationcannot be
assigned, " the franchises to build, own, and manage a railroad, and
take tolls thereon, are not necessarily corporate rights ; they are
capable of existing in and of being enjoyed by natural persons,
and there is nothing in their nature inconsistent with their being
assignable." CURTIs, J., in Hall vs. Sullivan Railway. At most,
it would seem that an assignment can only work a forfeiture. And
if the State waives such forfeiture, the question cannot be raised
,collaterally by other-parties. The cases on this subject are cited
and reviewed in Redfield on Railways, § 235, notes 19 and 20.
The mortgage, in the case at bar, of all the franchises and propas
erty of the corporation, is as effectual between the parties to it,
if, like those in some of the cases cited, it had been made under a
special act of the legislature. Whether the assignees of the mortgage, without any further proceedings, legislative or judicial, will
have all the corporate rights of the company, is not a question now
presented. The subsequent statute of 1852, prohibiting any com-
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pany from assigning any rights under its charter without the consent of the legislature, expressly excepts mortgages made to secure
debts of the corporation, and rbcognises their validity. R. S., ch.
51, sec. 31.
In the case of Trust Company vs. Hendrickson it was held that,

as between mortgagors and mortgagees, the engines and cars were
fixtures, so that, without any express grant, they would have become the property of the mortgagees by being attached to the
railroad. If they were fixtures, that result would follow, although
they were not in existence when the mortgage was given. That
they have some of the qualities of fixtures cannot be denied. They
are fitted to the gauge of the road, and are adapted to the particular use upon it. In the modern cases, whether an article is a fixture is determined more by such considerations, than by its being
actually attached to the land. Without the rolling stock, the road
is not only worthless to the company, but it ceases to be of any
publi use. Important public interests are therefore involved in
the question.
But if the engines and cars are not fixtures, they are so connected with tlie railroad, and so indispensable to its operation, that
there is a clear distinction between them and other kinds of personal property. They may well be held to be exceptions. to the
general rule that property not in esse cannot be conveyed. We do
not mean to intimate that rolling stock to be subsequently acquired could be mortgaged without the railroad. But when the
railroad itself is mortgaged, with the franchise, the rolling stock
to. be acquired for the purpose of completing or repairing it is so
appurtenant to it, that the company have a present, existing interest in it, sufficient to uphold the grant of both together-the
the
one as incident to the other. Their title to the railroad is ",
foundation of an interest" in the cars and engines to be acquired
for its use.
" If the rolling stock on the road should be removed," says McLEAN, J., in the case of Coe vs. Hart, "it would defeat the liens
of creditors to many millions of dollars, and put an end to the construction, if not to the maintenance, of railroads." In the case of
Ludlow vs. Hurd, 6 Am. L. Reg. 498, STORER, J., remarks: " It
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is very clear that we must regard it (the rolling stock), as appurtenant to a railroad; it is necessary for the working of it that all
this species 6f property should become a part of the road itself. It
is essential to its use ; and if denied, it is destructive to the purpose for which it was built." And in the case of Phillips vs.
Winslow, before cited, the Court say that, in order to render the
mortgage of the railroad effectual, ,,it is necessary that it should
embrace all such future acquisitions of the company as are proper
accessions to the thing pledged, and essential to its enjoyment."
That a mortgage of a railroad and the franchises of the company, with all the rolling stock then owned and to be afterwards
acquired and placed on the road, will create a valid lien upon cars
and engines subsequently purchased, there would seem to be no
longer any doubt. 'Redfield on Railways, § 285, notes 21 to 24;
Pierce's Am. Railroad Law 581; Am. Law Reg., July 1868, 527.
The decisions sustaining such mortgages are not understood to
be in conflict with those in which other mortgages of such property
have not been upheld. The general rule, that property not in es8e
cannot be conveyed, is not abrogated. Nor will such mortgages
be upheld in equity, any more than at law, unless they are within
some of the exceptions to the rule. ' But if a mortgage is within
any of the exceptions it.will be sustained, and the parties will be
entitled to appropriate remedies.
What remedies will be open to them must depend upon the circumstances of each case. In Holroyd vs. Marshall, 9 Jur. N. S.
213, recently decided by the House of Lords, a registered mortgage
of machinery in a mill, together with all that should afterward be
placed therein in addition to or in substitution for that which was
there at the time, was held to have created a valid lien upon the
portion afterwards purchased, from the time when it was brought
within the terms of the grant. And the rights of the mortgagee
were sustained in equity, on the ground that the mortgagor, as
soon as he purchased the additional machinery and put it into the
mill, held it in trust for the mortgagee. Whether we should uphold such a mortgage, is a question upon which it is unnecessary
to express any opinion. The case seems to be in conflict with
that of MAoody vs. Wright, 13 Met. 17. But in those cases in
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which a mortgage of such property is valid, there would seem to
be no doubt that it can be enforced in equity as a.case of tru8t.
It has been suggested by counsel that, if the mortgage in the
case at bar can be supported in equity, it cannot be in this suit at
law. We have already seen that this action of trover must fail,
because it is not an appropriate one in which to try the question of
title. But if it were otherwise, the mortgage being sustainable in
equity, the result would be the same. The property was in the
custody of the Court, upon a bill in equity, which is still pending,
brought for the purpose of determining the rights of all persons
to all the property mortgaged. The suit at law is incidental to
the bill in equity, having been brought by special permission of
the Court. It cannot be permitted to defeat the proceedings in
equity, in regard to any property embraced in the mortgage. If
the equitable title is in the assignees of the mortgage, and they,
or the cestuis que trudt, are seeking to enforce their rights by a
bill in equity, the property being in the hands of a receiver, it
would be strange indeed if the whole proceedings could be defeated
by the assertion of the legal title subject to the mortgage. The
bill in equityhaving been commenced first, and the property taken
possession of under it, all incidental claims, whether by a suit at
law or otherwise, .are merely interlocutory. Upon whatever property the bill is finally sustained, it will operate to convert equitable
into legat'titles. Therefore no suit at law, however appropriate,
could be sustained for the possession of any property to which the
trustees have an equitable title.
. Upon the whole case, we are of the opinion that the mortgage
to Myers created a valid lien upon the engines and cars as they
were purchased and placed upon the road for the purpose of equi ping it; and that the holders of the bonds secured by that mort.
gage will be entitled, if they claim it, to have the trust enforced,
not only against the railroad, but against the rolling stock subsequently acquired.
Plaintiffs nonsuited.
The foregoing opinion, which has been

care, has been furnished us by the

prepared with great thoroughness and courtesy of Mr. Justice DAvis.

There
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are many questions of considerable practical interest involved in the discussion
which will repay a careful reading
1. The precise point of the rights of
adversary claimants to prosecute their
claims against a receiver of the Court
of Chancery, while acting in that capacity, is here very clearly stated. The
doctrine as one of the established principles of chancery practice, is very
clearly established, that Courts of Chancery will, in the language of Chancellor
WALWOnTH in Parker vs. Browning, 8
Paige 888, "where the -property is
legally and properly in the possession
of the receiver,"

*

*

*

"protect

that possession, not only against acts of
violence, but also against suits at law,
so that a third person claiming the
same may be compelled to come in and
ask to be examined pro interesse 8uo, if
he wishes to test the justice of such
claim;" or, as is held in other cases,
obtain leave to prosecute his claim
against the receiver. But the exact
point of the proper limitation to be applied to this doctrine is stated very forcibly in the principal case, and especially
the distinction between suits for the value
of personal property in the possession

pressure of commercial exigencies, generally outrun and take the lead of the
Courts of justice, in moulding present
means and appliances to the multiplying emergencies which an advancing
civilization is constantly presenting.
This is indeed the natural order o
things, and when the Courts: attempi
to take the lead in law reforms of thai
character, it is not, as a general thing,
so judiciously accomplished as when
chiefly matured by the practical experience of business men. But it has seemed
to us that the time had fully come for the
American Courts to recognise the power
of a Court of Equity to give full effect
to a contract of mortgage of future acquisitions of personal estate. The only
possible embarrassment in giving effect
to such contracts as contracts for a
future mortgage, and in allowing them
to take effect in presenti by way of trust.
whenever such property is acquired.
the mortgagor and future purchaser
from the moment of acquisition, standing
as the trustee of the mortgagee, consists
in the want of visible, substantial possession in'the mortgagee. But this will be
effected through the registry so soon as
such contracts are recognised as creating
a valid subsisting equitable mortgage.
This principle is fully adopted in the case
of Holroyd vs. Marshall, 9 Jur. N. S.
213, decided by the House of Lords
within the last year. The general
question was there discussed at length,

of the receiver, and those for the possssion of the specific property. See Peck
Vs. Crane, 25 Vt. R. 146.
2. The question of the capacity of the
mortgator of future acquired personal
estate, to create a valid present property
therein, is here examined with thorough- by the present Lord Chancellor WESTness, and discussed with great clearness mBRy, by Lord WENSLEYDALE and by
and precision. The point is every day Lord CnARwonTir, and all the English
becoming more and more important, not cases bearing upon the question, elaborto use any stronger expression ; and ately reviewed, and the following points
we are sorry to feel that the American held clearly established in the English
Courts do not seem, as yet, to have fully law.
waked up to the magnitude of the inter1. That at law a mortgage or sale of
ests involved in that and kindred ques- future acquired personal property, the
tions. The public interest, and the ne- mortgagor neither having acquired the
cessities of business men, under the thing or the agent of its production at
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the time of making the contract, creates
no valid subsisting property. But even
at law, if the future acquired property
be the product of present property in
the mortgagor, or what is expressed
more briefly, as potentially, his property,
as the wool growingon a flock of sheep,
or the produce of a dairy, or a farm, or
anything of that character, the contract
of mortgage will take effect upon the
property as soon as it comes into existence, and will be perfectly binding
at law. And, on the other hand, where
the contract is not understood to identify any particular property, so that it
can be known to what it was intended
to apply, it will have no binding effect,
either at law or in equity. Mogg vs.
Baker, 8 M. & W. 195.
2. But where the contract is of so
specific a character that a Court of
Equity would decree a specific performance, it will always create a valid, present interest in equity, which a Court
of Chancery will enforce against any
future incumbrancer, whether with or
without notice. And in such cases it is
not requisite, in order to protect the right
of the mortgagee, that proof be made
of any act on his part looking towards
actual possession of the goods, or of
their identification under the contract, orof any notice in fact to the subsequent
incumbrancer at or before his interest
attached.
It has been held that where the assignment is of future property entirely
of an indefinite character, as of the
fut ure earnings of a ship not on a voy
age then contemplated, but without reference to any particular voyage, that
the contract remaining in force will
attach to the property when it comes
into existence, and may be made available by some new act of possession or
Identification, as Lord BAcoa's maxim
has it, "novzu acdua internmim." AWi

accordingly many contracts of this class
contain a power to take possession of
such future acquisitions. See Robinson
vs. MacDonell, 5 Man. & S. 228; Lunn
vs. Thornton, 1 C. B. 879; Congrevr
vs. Evetts, 10 Exch. 298; Hope vs
Haley, 5 Ell. & Bl. 880-845. s. a., 84
Eng. L. & Eq. R. 189.
Some cases have been understood to
favor the construction that some such
future act of possession or identification was necessary in all cases, where
property not in esse was attempted to
be assigned, at least as against future
incumbrances; or else that there should
be distinct evidence of notice to the subsequent incumbrancer. Langton vs. Horton, 1 Hare 549; Whitworth vs. Gaugain, 1 Phill. 788.
But even this requisite has been repudiated in later and better considered
cases. Lord ST LEoNAnns, in Abbott
vs. Stratton, 3 Jo. & Latt 6031; Whitworth vs. Gaugain, 8 Hare 416; and
the same case affirmed by the Chancellor, ubi supria. Stress is indeed placed
by the Lord Chancellor in Metealfe vs.
The Archbishop of York, I Myl. & Cr.
547-555, upon the fact of notice to the
subsequent incumbrancer.
But that
fact was declared unimportant in many
of the cases already cited, and especially
in the late case of Holroyd vs. Marshall.
2. This.subject has been under consideration in numerous cases in the
American Courts, affecting railway
mortgages, and so far as appears no
question has ever been made by those
Courts in regard to the entire validity
of such mortgages, even when made to
cover the future accessions and acquisitions of the road; and as against subsequent inecumbrances equally with the
mortgagors in all cases where the cot
porations -possessed full power to execute valid contracts of the character in.
qpuption. Howe vs. iReeman, 14 Gray.,
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R. 56d; Pennock vs. Coe, 23 How. U. S.
Rep. 117. See also Williuk vs. Morris
Canal & Banking Co., 3 Green. Ch.
Rep. 402.
3. The franchise to build and operate
a railway is an important property in
iftelf, and whenever the power to assign
such franchise as security for debt exists, it must necessarily carry with it
all accessory and incidental acquisitions,
which attach to the franchise, and constitute the structure and accessory fixtures, together with the rolling stock,
which, although not. in itself strictly
a fixture, is obviously an indispensable
adjunct or accessory, so that the right
to create a valid incumbrance upon a
railway, and its future accessions and
acquisitions, in no sense contravenes any
of the decisions, at law, wherein it has
been held that no valid assignment of
non-existing property could be made.
4. The question incidentally discussed in the principal case, in regard to
the capacity of a railway company to
create a valid lien, in equity at least,
upon its roadway and other property,
without aniy special legislative sanction,
either directly or indirectly, through the
means of either general or particular
provisions of statutes, is one of so much
uncertainty, under the existing state
of the decisions, that very little definite
and reliable information can at present
be given in regard to it, Judging of
the thing upon principle merely, we
should not have supposed therewas any
inimicable obstacle to the creation of
such a lien; but we have been more
inclined of late than formerly, to the
opinion that such a contract did require
express or implied legislative sanction,
independent of the mere creation of the
corporation. The decisions in the English Courts, so far as the question has
been raised there, which can hardly be
said to have occurred in any very definite
VOL. XII.-3

form, are all against any such power
existing in railway corporations, except
The
by the consent of the legislature.
assignment and transfer of the possession and use of these public works,
which have engrossed almost the entiretrade and transportation of the country.
is held, in England, exclusively under
Parliamentary powers, and does not
seem to be considered as coming within
the general discretion of Courts of
Equity. Hence all contracts, looking towards the ultimate transfer of such use
or possession, in contingencies distinctly
provided for in the instrument, if made
without Parliamentary authority, are
there regarded as invalid. How far
it may be practicable to create pledges
of the earnings or tolls of such corporations, without a concurrent right to assume the control of the works, except
through the officers of a Court of Chancery. is a question not much discussed
in this country. Contracts of that kind
do not seem to involve any transfer of
the corporate franchises or any change in
their control, except through the agency
of the Courts of Equity; and their
enforcement might come within the
general powers of Courts of Equity.
But we apprehend it is not competent
for a Court of Equity to transform a
contract in the form of a mortgage, a~id for *hose execution no
power existed in the corporation, into
one of an entirely different character,
which might have been executed by the
parties and carried into effect by the
Courts, and probably would have been,
if the defect of authority had been fully
understood. And if this even might be
allowable, between the original parties,
it certainly could not be done against
subsequent incumbrancers, -where legal
priority is generally regarded as of the
essence of the rights in controversy.
I. F. R
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Where goods are sold to a married woman upon her individual credit, although the
vendors are ignorant of the fact of coverture, there is no liability ez contractu on
the part of the husband to pay for them.
But if the credit to the wife was obtained by fraudulent representations on her
part that she was unmarried, the vendor may have an action against the husband
and wife jointly, either to recover the goods, or damages, for their conversion;
or semble, an action on the case for damages for the fraud.
For tort of the wife committed in the presence or by order of the husband, the
latter alone is liable, and after his death no action survives against the wife for
such tort.
But if the tort was not in the husband's presence or by his order, it is the wrong
of the wife although the husband is jointly liable with her, and in such case an
action will survive against the wife alone after the death of the husband.
Therefore where goods had been sold to a married woman on her false representa-tions that she was sole, and she had given notes in payment for the goods, it
was hed, that her promise made after the death of her husband, to pay the
notes, was an undertaking by her to pay a demand for which a cause of action
existed against her from the time she purchased the goods, and therefore was
founded on a good and sufficient consideration.
Though the general rule is that a moral obligation is not alone a sufficient consideration to support a promise, yet there are cases where a moral obligation
founded upon an antecedent valuable consideration is sufficient to sustaiA a promise though the obligation on which it is founded never could have been en.
forced at law.
The note Wennall vs. Adney, 8 Bos. & Pl. 252, commented on and limited.

Demurrer.-Ground assigned that the complaint did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The Supreme Court,
at special term, gave judgment on the demurrer for defendant, and,.
at general term, in the first district, affirmed this judgment, whereupon plaintiff appealed to this Court.
Andrew Boardman for plaintiff.
John H. _'eynold8 for defendant.
The opinion of the Court was delivered:by
J.-The complaint shows that goods were sold and delivered to the defendant, solely on her credit and responsibility, she then
being a trader, doing business in her own name, for her own personal
BALCOM,
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benefit and advantage, and holding herself out to be an unmarried
woman, and that she gave notes for the goods; but that at the time
she purchased the goods, and gave the notes, she was the wife of one
Davidson, of which fact the vendors of the goods and holders of the
notes were ignorant. That the husband of the defendant subsequently died, and that after his death the defendant, in consideration of the premises and of her duty in that behalf, and of the moral
obligation resting upon her to pay for the goods, and to pay the
notes, undertook and promised to and with the vendors of the goods
and holders of the notes to pay the same, and for the goods and
every part thereof.
There is also an averment in the complaint showing that the
plaintiff became the owner of the alleged causes of action before he
commenced the suit.
The action was commenced in 1857, and it must be determined
by the rules of the common law, irrespective of the alterations
made by our recent statutes in the laws affecting husband and wife.
It cannot be said that the husband of the defendant was ever
liable ex contractu to pay for the goods. They were not necessaries, and there is no allegation in the complaint that he knew of
the purchase of the goods by his wife, or that they ever came to his
possession.
There was, therefore, no implied promise on the part of the husband to pay for the goods. STORY says: "If credit be given solely
to the wife, the husband is not liable, although they live together,
and although he see her in possession of the goods bought. If,
therefore, the tradesman should take her promissory note in payment, which would plainly indicate a reliance on her personal credit,
the husband would not be liable for the price of the goods, nor on
the note, nor need he prove that the goods were not necessaries."Story on Contracts, 4th ed., § 108; see 2 Bright on Husband and
Wife, 17 and 18.
But the vendors could have maintained an action against the defendant and her husband jointly, in the lifetime of the latter, to
recover possession of the goods, or for a conversion thereof by the
former, on the ground that the goods were fraudulently obtained by
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the wife, by falsely holding herself out to be unmarried and doing
business as a trader in her own name, and for her own personal
benefit and advantage; and I will not say but an action on the
case for damages for the fraud would have lain against the husband
and wife jointly. KENT says: "The husband is liable for the torts
and frauds of the wife committed during coverture. If committed
in his company, or by his order, he alone is liable. If not, they
are jointly liable, and the wife must be joined with the husband."
2 Kent's Com., 9th ed., 138 ; see also 2 Bright on Husband and
Wife 79 and 80; 1 Story on Con., 4th ed., § 109; Reeve's Dom.
Rel., 2d ed., 72 and 73. By reason of the fraud of the wife the
title to the goods remained in the vendors, and the possession or
conversion thereof by the wife was wrongful. - Ga'y vs. Holaiting,
1 Hill 311 ; NichoU vs. Michae, 23 N. Y. Reps. 264. Hence the
right of the vendors to maintain either of the actions formerly called
replevin and trover for the goods.
When the wife commits a tort by order of her husband, or in company with him, he alone is liable; and in case of his death they do
not survive against the wife. Reeve's Dom. Rel., 2d ed., 72. But
if the tort be not committed in the presence of the husband, or by
his order or request, the-wife is also liable, and must be joined in
the suit with her husband. The wrong is in such a case considered
as her wrong; and the husband is answerable with the wife for
similar reasons for his liability for her contracts before marriage.
Reeve's Dom. Rel., 2d ed., 72. And I am of the opinion a"cause
of action for such a wrong survives against the wife on the death
of her husband. It was held by Lord ELLENBOROUGH, in Woodman vs. Chapman, (1 Camp. 189,) that a debt contracted by the
wife before marriage survives against her upon the death of her
husband, and such holding was undoubtedly correct. It is laid
down by Macqueen on Husband and Wife, (Law Library, 4th series, vol. 34, p. 123,) that "causes of action survive against the wife,
which accrued during the coverture, in respect of the real estate,
or for any personal wrongs done by her when sole." The only
authority cited by him for this rule is the note by Lord CAMPBELL
to the above case of Woodman vs. hapman; and the language of-
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that is, that "causes of action survive to the wife which accrued
during the coverture, in respect of her real estate, or for any personal wrongs done her." But-whether the doctrine laid down by
Macqueen is or is not supported by the authority cited by him, it
rests upon the same principle that makes the debts of the wife contracted before her marriage, which are not recovered of the husband
and wife during the life of the former, survive against the latter,
and therefore is good law. The personal representatives of the
husband cannot be charged with such debts ; and on similar principles they must be exempted from liability for torts of the wife
committed in the absence of her husband, and not in his business,
and without his concurrence or knowledge ; for such torts, as
has already been seen, are considered her torts. See Cox vs. Kitehin, 1 Bos. & Puller 338.
The only authority I have found which seems to militate against
any of the foregoing conclusions, is the decision of the Court of
Exchequer in Fairhurstand Wife vs. The Liverpool Adelphi Loan
Association, 26 Eng. Law and Equity Reps. 898, where it was held
that an action will not lie against a husband and wife for a false
and fraudulent representation by the wife to the plaintiffs, that she
was sole and unmarried at the time of her signing a promissory note
as surety to them for a third person, whereby they were induced to
advance a sum of money to that person. The opinion of Judge
REEVE is to the contrary. Reeve's Dom. Rel., 2d ed., 72 and 73.
But if the decision of the Court of Exchequer be correct, it is
placed on the same ground that an infant is exempted from liability
for damages in actions for wrongs, when founded on contract; and
when goods are sold to an infant on credit, and he avails himself of
his infancy to avoid payment, the vendor may reclaim the goods as
having never parted with his property in them. Badgervs. 1PhinRey, 15 Mass. Reps. 359. Either what was formerly called trover
or replevin may be maintained for the goods in such a case. See
Wallace vs. Mo88, 5 Hill 391. In such a case the action is brought
in disaffirmance of the contract, and on the ground that the vendor
still retains the title to the goods. Upon the same principle either
an action to recover possession, or one for conversion, could have
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been maintained against the defendant and her husband for the
goods sold to the former in this case. And should we concede that
the vendors could not have recovered in an action against them fol
damages merely, for the fraud of the wife in obtaining the goods
there still remained two kinds of action, either of which could have
been maintained against her as well as her husband; and the cause
therefor survived against the defendant on the death of her husband.
If these views are correct the promise of the defendant, after the
death of her husband, to pay for the goods, and to pay the notes
given for them, was an undertaking by her to pay a demand for
which a cause of action existed against her from the time she purchased the goods, and therefore was founded on a good and sufficient
consideration, and is clearly obligatory upon her.
There is another view of the case which shows that the promise of
the defendant to pay for the goods, and pay the notes she gave
therefor,. was founded upon a sufficient consideration.
I am aware the general rule is that a moral obligation is not
alone a sufficient legal consideration to support a promise. See 1
Story on Con., 4th ed., § 465 to § 469; Chitty on Con., 9th Am.
ed., 48 and 49 ; 24 Wend. 97 ; 1 Hill 582; 5 Id. 806.
And the Superior Court of New York City went so far in Watkin
vs. Halstead,2 Sand. S. C. Reps. 811,which case was followed by the
Supreme Court in this, as to adopt the language of a note to Wennall vs. Adne~y, 8 Bos. &Pul. 252, where it was said that "an express promise can only revive a precedent good consideration which
might have been enforced at law through the medium of an implied
promise, had it not been suspended by some positive rule of law;
but can give.no original right of action, if the obligation on which it
is founded never could have been enforced at law, though not barred
by any legal maxim or statute provision." But this rule is-too
broad, or at least there are exceptions to it. For there are cases
where a moral obligation that is founded upon an antecedent valuable consideration is sufficient to sustain, a promise, though the
obligation, on which it is founded, never could have been enforced
at law. In other words, a moral obligation is sometimes a sufficient
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consideration for an express promise, if, at some time or other, a
good or valuable consideration has existed, although there never
was a time prior to such express promise when any portion of the
precedent consideration could have been enforced at law or in
equity through the medium of any promise. To illustrate: If
money be loaned upon usury, and usurious security taken therefor,
such security is absolutely void, and no action can be maintained
upon it; nor is it evidence of an indebtedness, upon the strength
of which the law will imply a promise on the part of the borrower,
to repay the amount actually received by him. The express contract being absolutely void, no implied obligation can spring from
it. The lender cannot waive or abandon the usurious agreement so
far as it is illegal, and enforce it for the residue. The contract is
one; no matter what the nature or number of the securities may be,
all'are void. The contract cannot be broken up and resolved into
its original parts or elements, so as to get rid of the illegal taint
without the consent of both parties. But if it is mutually abandoned, and the securities are cancelled or destroyed, so that they
can never be made the foundation of an action, and the borrower
subsequently promises to pay the amount actually received by him,
such promise is legal and binding. It is founded upon an equitable
and moral obligation, which is sufficient to support an express
promise. The money actually lent, when legally separated from
the usurious premium, is a debt in equity and conscience, and
oughbt to be repaid. Per SUTHERLAND, J., in Hammond vs. Hopping, 13 Wend. 511 and 512; also Miller vs. Hull, 4 Denio 104;
Chitty on Con., 9th Am. ed., 712 and 713; 2 Parsons on Con., 3d ed.
397; Parsons' Mercantile Law 257; 1 Story on Con., 4th ed.,
§ 603 ; Barnes vs. Redley, 2 Taunton 184.
In Lee vs. Muggeridge, 5 Taunton 35, a feme covert, having an
estate, settled to her separate use, gave a bond for repayment of
money by her executors, of money advanced at her request, on
security of that bond, to her son-in-law, and after her husband's
decease, she wrote, promising that her executors should settle the
bond, and it was held that assumpsit would lie against the executors on such promise of the testatrix. That case was not over.
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ruled by the decision in Meyer vs. Haworth, 8 Adol. & Ellis 467,
though it must be conceded, it was very much weakened as an
authority in England, by £a8twood vs. Kenyon, 11 Adol. & Ellis
438; and Littlefield, executrix, &o., vs. Shee, 2 Barn. & Ado]. 811,.
was put mainly upon the ground that the price of the goods
originally constituted a debt from the husband, though Iord
TENTERDEN in deciding it said he must also observe "that the
doctrine that a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for a
subsequent promise, is one which should be received with some
limitation." Lee vs. Huggeridege has never been overruled in this
State. Smith vs. Ware, 13 Johns. 257, does not do it. For that
was a case to recover back money the plaintiff had paid the defendant for land, the former claiming there was a deficiency in the
number of acres, and Judge SPENCER, in delivering the opinion of
the court, said: "It bannot be pretended that the defendant was
under any moral obligation to pay for the deficiency in quantity of
land sold and conveyed to the plaintiff." All that was decided in
.Ehle vs.- Judson, 24 Wend. 97, was that a mere moral or conscientious obligation, unconnected with a prior legal or equitable
claim, is not a sufficient consideration to support a promise; and
Judge BRoNsoN, who gave the opinion of the court, said: "The
moral obligation to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations,
or an insolvent discharge, or to pay a debt contracted during infancy or coverture and the like, will be a good consideration for an
express promise." In Wilson vs. Burr, 25 Wend. 386, it was held
the plaintiff could recover his claim of $200, counsel fees; and the
court said: "It is true at the time of the retainer, the defendant
wis afeme covert; but she was soon after divorced, and it is to be
presumed subsequently recognised the services rendered."
There are some, perhaps many, broad assertions in our reports
going to show that the promise of the defendant in this case is not
obligatory; and the reasoning tends that way in the following
cases: Geer and Wife vs. Archer, 2 Barb. 420; Nash vs. Bussell,
5 Id. 556, and Ingraham vs. Gilbert, 20 Id. 151. But there are
equally broad expressions in our reports'the other way; and the
reasoning in such cases as Doty vs. Wilson, 14 Johns. 878, and
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others I might mention, certainly tends to the conclusion that such
promise is binding, as, injustice, it clearly ought to be.
The goods were sold and delivered by the vendors with the expectation on their part, that they would receive pay for the same,
and upon the defendant's express promise that she would pay for
them, and under such circumstances that the vendors had no claim
therefor against her husband. The goods were valuable, and the
defendant personally received the benefit of them; and the price
she agreed to pay therefor, is a debt, which in equity and conscience she ought to pay. In other words, she ought in common
honesty to pay for the goods. Her promise so to do was made for
value actually received by her personally; and it was to discharge
a moral obligation founded upon an antecedent valuable consideration, created for her own personal benefit, and at -her special
instance and request; and I am of the opinion the law makes such
promise obligatory upon her.
It seems to me that the defendant's moral obligation to pay this
debt is'so interwoven with equities as to furnish a good consideration both upon principle and authority for her promise to pay it;
I will add that the fact is controlling with me, that the defendant
personally received a valuable consideration for the money she has
promised to pay; and this distinguishes the case from some that
seem to weigh against the conclusion that the defendant's promise
is valid.
It is unnecessary to notice any of the recent changes made by
our Legislature in the law affecting husband and wife, as they are
all inapplicable to the case, which must be determined as the law
was when the alleged cause of action occurred.
For the foregoing reasons I am of opinion that the complaint states
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that the judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed and judgment given
for the plaintiff on the demurrer with costs; but with liberty to the
defendant to apply to the Supreme Court for leave to answer on
terms.
DENIO, 0. J., SELDEN, ROSEKRANS,
DAVIES, JJ., concurred.

BIARVIN, WRIGHT,

and

GOULDING vs. DAVIDSON.

The latter delivered an opinion, in which he only considered the
case in the aspect presented in the concluding portion of the
opinion of Judge BALCOM, and agreed substantially with him.
Decision in conformity to the opinion of Judge BALCOM.
1. The question whether a married woman is responsible civilly, when she
fraudulently represents herself to be a
single woman, and thus obtains credit,
is, confessedly, one of considerable
nicety. The very few cases in the law
books in which the point has been
raised would tend to show that the
opinion of the profession was adverse
to her responsibility. The question may
present itself either at law or in eguity.
1. At law. The leading English
case is The Liverpool Adelphi Association vs. Fairhurst, 9 Exchequer
Rep. p. 422, (A. D. 1854.) The decision
in that case was that the wife cannot be
responsible, and that the husband cannot be sued for the fraudulent representation togethpr with the wife. The
Court say: "If such an action were
allowed, it is obvious that the wife
would lose the protection which the
law gives her against "contracts made by
her during coverture; for there is not
a contract of any kind which a feme
covert could make whilst she knew her
husband to be alive, that could not be
treated as a fraud. For every such contract would involve in itself a fraudulent representation of her capacity to
sue." [contract.]
It is difficult to avoid this reasoning.
It is probably the better opinion, that a
married woman is not responsible upon
a fraudulent representation that she is
single, so as to be liable civilly after
the husband's death. The most that the
person who had dealt with her could do
would be to reclaim the property which
he had parted with upon the theory that
there was no contract

A like conclusion would be drawn from
the cases which have been decided
respecting the right to bring actions
against infants for deceit. The English
authorities seem nearly or quite uniform
from the early case of Johnson vs. Pie
to the present time. Johnson vs. Pie
is reported in 1 Levinz 169; Siderfin
258. The reasons for the decision are
well given in Siderfin. The infant had
affirmed that he was of full age, and,
confidingin hisrepresentation, the plaintiff had lent him money. The plaintiff
brought an action on the case for the deceit. By the Coturt, "althoughinfants may
be bound byactual torts, as trespass, &c.,
which are vi et contrapacem, they will not
be bound by those which sound in deceit,
for if they were, all the infants in England would' be ruined, and in cases
where their contracts were not binding
they would be charged as for a tort." A
curious case is reported in 8 eble 869,
Scroggam vs. Stewardson. It is very
short, and is stated in full. "Trespass
by infant, by guardian. The defendant
pleads that the plaintiff was above sixteen years old, and agreed for sixpenco
in hand paid, that the defendant have
license to take two ounces of her hair;
to which plaintiff demurred, and per
curiam. it is no plea, for the infant cannot license though she may agree with
the barber to be trimmed, andjudgnent
for the plaintiff." Here was conduct on
the infant's part very similar to a fraud,
and yet she was allowed to take advantage of her position. It is believed that
the only case in the English reports
which appears at all in opposition to
Johnson vs. Pie is Bristow vs. Eastman,
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1 Esp. 171. An infant had embezzled
money from his employer, who brought
an action of money had and received to
recover it again. Lord KEarox held
the action maintainable on the express
ground that the action for money had
and received was in this particular case
equivalent to an action of trover for the
money. It is a Nisi Prius case, and if
Inconsistent with the other authorities
should not be followed. See Mills vs.
Graham, 4 Bos. & Pull. 140; Jennings
vs. Randall, 8 Term R. 335; Green vs.
Greenbank, 2 Marshall 485.
2. The rule in Equity. There is a
class of cases in the English Courts of
Equity which sustains the doctrine that
a married woman may be responsible
upon equitable principles for her fraudulent representations. The leading
case is Vaughan vs. Vanderstegen, before
KUNDERSLzEY, V. C., 2 Drewry's Rep. 379,
et seQ. (A. D. 1854.) In this case, the
fact that the woman was married was
not known to the creditor, to whom she
represented herself to be single. The
creditor lent her money in consequence,
and it was held that he had the right to
charge the debt upon her general assets.
The Court reposed principally upon
Savage vs. Foster, 9 Modern R. 30.
The case was not rested upon the
theory of a charge upon an estate settled to her separate use, but on the
ground that her general assets were
liable.
The Court says, "If a man or feme
sole had borrowed money and had died,
what would be applicable ? The general
assets: * * * and so it appears to
me the same principle would prevail
here." p 382. The principle was enunciated in its broadest terms that a married woman is not only capable of
committing a fraud, but that her property is liable to be visited in a Court
of Equity with the consequences of that

fraud, p. 880. The same principle was
adopted in the case of an infant who
had obtained a loan on a representation
which he knew to be false, that he was
of age. It was held that proof to establish. the loan was properly admitted
in Bankruptcy. The case in Bankruptcy was placed by the Commissioner
on the same ground as Vaughan vs.
Vanderstegen, above cited. On appeal
to the Lords Justices, the same doctrine
was held. Ex parie The United Joint
Stock Mutual Banking Association, 8
De Gex & Jones 63. See also, Wright
vs. Snow, 2 De Gex & Smale 821;
Stikeman vs. Dawson, 1 De Gex & Smale
90, (A. D. 1847.) Some earlier cases in
equity in which the same doctrine is
more or less distinctly held or discussed,
are Wallis vs. Cresswell, 9 Viner's Abr.
title Enfant, pl. 24, p. 415, in which case
Lord CowPEn said: "If an infant is old
and cunning enough to contrive and carry
on a fraud, I think in a Court of Equity
he ought to make satisfaction for it."
Jackson vs. Morehouse, 2 Merivale 483;
Cory vs. Gerteken, 2 Madd. 40; Overton
vs. Bannister, 3 Hare 503.
Notwithstanding this array of authority, the doctrine is not satisfactory.
The great objection to it is that it enables persons whom the law, for wise
reasons, has rendered incapable to make
contracts, at their own discretion to
avoid the effects of therule. They have
only to represent themselves as capable
to contract, in order to obtain such capacity. The doctrine induces wives
and infants to commit fraud in order to
obtain the power to contract by the
fraudulent act. The English Court of
Appeal (the Lords Justices), while recognising the fact that the doctrine was
settled, is evidently dissatisfied with it,
Lord Justice T'uxNE saying that he
had the strongest inclination not to follow it, and indireetly recommending an
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after her husband's death, in consideration of forbearance, promised to pay it.
It was held that the note was not
barely voidable but absolute'7 void,
and that forbearance where originally there is no cause of action is no
consideration to raise an assumpsit,
though it might be otherwise where
the contract was but voidable. This
case is approved in Eastwood vs. Kenyon, cited supra.
We must respectfully dissent from
the opinion in the principal case, that
this question is governed by any analogy derived from the law of usury. It
seems to us that usury is within the
proposition contained in the note to
Wennall vs. Adney. A usurious contract has every element of a contract:
competent parties, subject-matter, assent and consideration. It could have
have been enforced at law were it not
for the statutory provision against unRepeal the statute,
lawtni interest.
and the contract made before the repeal may b6 enforced if the Legislature so provides. Curtis vs. Leavitt,
15 New York 9; Southern Life Insurance and Trust Co. vs. Packer, 17 Id.
51. Usury does not strictly render a
contract void, though this expression is
sometimes used. It is a defence, and can
only be urged by the debtor. Nothing
is better settled than that the usurer
cannot be heard to say that the contract was usurious. Tans the same
Court has decided that a usurer cannot say that a usurio' s contract of
forbearance, whereby h 1 gave time to
void, so that
his principal debtor, v ,r.
it did not discharge vsi surety. La
Farge vs. Herter, 5 Srden 241. The
Court says, "The taksng of usury is
a misdemeanor by stutute, and the
agreement to take it is, in the eye and
case a married woman gave a promis- in the language of ti-a law, corrupt.
sory note as a single woman, and The parties, however, uo not. stand i

appeal to the House of Lords with the
object of having the doctrine overruled.
8 De Gex & Jones 63, supra.
II Assuming, as we have endeavored
to show, that the wife is not liable at
law to an action on the case for a fraudulent representation by which a contract was made, will a subsequent promise after the husband's death to pay
for the consideration obtained be binding on the wife? We had supposed this
proposition settled by the note to Wennall vs. Adney, 8 Bos. & Pull. 252. This
note has often been approved by Courts
both in England and in this country,
and sanctioned by accurate text writers.
It is expressly adopted by the King's
Bench in East.wood vs. Kenyon, 11
Adolphus & Ellis 488, (A: D. 1840,)
the Court making tbfe statement that
it has been very generally thought
to contain, a correct statement of the
law. It is stated by the same Court
six years afterwards in Beaumont vs.
Reeve, 8 Adolphus & Ellis N. S. 483,
that it had adopted the doctrine in the
note to Wennall vs. Adney as the law
of the Court. "This result we arrived
at after much deliberition, and we now
adhere to it." p. 487. The doctrine of
the note to Wennall vs. Adney is in substance this: An express promise cannot
be supported by a consideration from
which the law could not imply a promise, except where the express promise
does away with a legal suspension or
bar of a right of action, which but
for such suspension or bar would be
valid. In other words, it is substantially the difference between a voidable
contract, and one which is void in the
true sense, i. e. not binding on either
party. The great Lord CAMnmE in an
early case hinted at this distinction.
Loyd vs. Lee, 1 Strange 94. In-that
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par 4dlcto. It is oppression on one
side, and submission on the other. The
borrower, therefore, may set up usury
for the purpose of avoiding a contract
tainted with it, but the lender cannot.
In respect to this question, usury must
stand on the same footing as fraud. A
fraudulent contract cannot be avoided
by the party guilty of the fraud." p.
243. This case, therefore, comes within
the principle of the note to Wennall
vs. Adney. The contract is void only
at the election of the debtor. If the
usury is purged from the contract, a
new promise may be made to pay the
debt, which will be binding on the
debtor. On the other hand, it is equally
well settled that the contract of a married woman is binding on neitherparty.
Smith vs. Plomer, 15 East 607. In this
case, a tradesman had supplied a married woman, living apart from her
husband, with furniture upon hire. It
was held that he did not thereby
divest himself of the present right of
property in the goods, as the married
woman was incapable of acquiring the
property by contract. We believe, then,
the true distinction to be this: when
a contract is voidable one of the parties
is already bound, and it needs only the
accession of the other to make a mutual
contract, but where the contract is void,
a subsequent promise by one of the
parties to the other, still leaves it unilateral and without mutuality. The
other party to the void contract, notwithstanding such. subsequent promise,
is under no obligation on his part. The
new promise is consequently without
consideration.
On the whole, we agree with the remark of Ld. C. J.DmxNmA, in the case
of Eastwood vs. Kenyon, supra, that the
note to Wennall vs. Adney contains a correct statement of the law.
T. W. D.

[Since the above note was written, a
report has reached this country (London Jurist, Oct. 10, 1863, p. 1018) of
the case of Flight vs. Reed, just decided
in the English Court of Exchequer.
The opinion of the Court was delivered
by WiLDE, B. The point decided was
that a loan of money at usurious interest before the repeal of 12 Anne, c.
16,is a good consideration for a promise made after the repeal to repay the loan at the same interest.
The law on this point is so fully reviewed in a passage of the judgment,
that we quote it in full. The Court
says, "The general proposition within
which such a proposition falls is, we believe, first found promulgated in Lord
MANsriEL'S time. It is the subject of a
long note to the report to the case of
Wennall vs. Adney, 3 B. & P. 249. It
has been the subjict of much discussion in many subsequent cases. It
was stated most widely, ana -erhaps
too widely, in the case of Lee vs. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 45, and it has constantly been much qualified and sometimes disparaged since the case of
Eastwood vs. Kenyon, 11 Ad. & El. 445.
See Beaumont vs. Reeve, 8 Q. B. 487, and
Cocking vs. Ward, 1 C. B. 170. But it
was repeated and stated to be law by
PZtnzE, B., in Earle vs. Oliver, 2 Exch. 7,
who says, ' The strict rule of the Common Law was, no doubt, departed from
by Lord MANSFiELD in Hawks vs. Saunders, Cowp. 290, and Atkins vs. Hill, Id.
288. The principle of the rule laid
down by Lord MANSPIELD is, that when

the consideration was originally beneficial to the party promising, yet if he be
protected from liability by some provision of the statute or Common Law
meant for his advantage, he may renounce
the benefits of thitt law; and if he promises to pay the debt, which is only
what an honest man ought to do, he is
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then bound bylaw to perform it.' There
is a very able note to the case of Wennall vi.Adney, 3 C. B. 247, explaining
this at length. The instances given to
illustrate the principle are, among
others, the case of a debt barred by certificate [of bankruptcy] and by the Statute of Limitations; and the rule in
these instances has been so conitantly
followed, that there can be no doubt that
it is to be considered as the established
law." The Court further held that be-

fore the usury laws were repealed, the
usury would have to be purged from
the note, before the new promise would
be valid; but after the repeal, that would
not be necessary, as no principle of public policy was any loruger involved.
This case settles two points: one that
the note to Wennall vs. Adney is established law in England, and the other
that a new promise to pay a debt void
for usury is within the rule announced
in that note.-T. W. D.]

In the upreme Court of Michigan.
THE MICHIGAN INSURANCE COMPANY OF DETROIT Vs. HENRY H. BROWN
ET AL.

1

A mortgage to secure all existing debts without naming them, or fixing a limit of
liability, is not void for uncertainty, as it affords means of ascertaining, by inquiry, the amount claimed as due at any time.
Equity follows the analogies of the law where an analogous relief is sought upon
a similar claim, but where the relief sought is in its nature of equitable, not
legal cognisance, equity follows its own rules. Hence, in regard to the foreclosure of a mortgage, which is an ancient equitable remedy, equity, although
raising presumptions of payment from lapse of time, has not made them conclusive.
Therefore, on a bill for foreclosure and praying, under the statute of Michigan, a
.personal decree against the mortgagor for the balance that should be due if the
mortgaged premises should prove inadequate, the Court will decree the foreclosure, but the personal decree under the statute being in the nature of a legal
remedy, will not be made after such length of time as would have barred an
action at law on the bond.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-The bill in this cause was filed to foreclose a
mortgage made by Henry H. Brown and wife to complainant in
November, 1847, conditioned for the payment of "all sums of
2

We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of CAXPDzLO, J.
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money now due or hereafter to become due." The bill averred a
bond of previous date, conditioned for the payment of $11,800, and
interest. The bill was filed July 20, 1859. To this bill Brown
interposed the statute of limitations as a defence, and Barker averred
in his answer that on the 21st day of July, 1859, the day after the
bill was filed, he purchased the premises from Brown for a valuable
consideration (the amount of which was not set forth), without
notice of the mortgage, which was, however, on record. He claimed
that the mortgage was invalid because not for a sum certain set
forth on its face.
I The-mortgage and bond set forth in the bill were proved as ex.
hibits before the Commissioner, and are returned as a part of the
record. But defendants claim they should be excluded,, on the
allegation that they were excluded in the court below as not filed in
season. Affidavits are filed on both sides;
. We have no doubt the pr6ofs are properly in the tase. They appear distinctly to have been, regularly taken on proper notice, and
if they were not filed earlier than is alleged, the court could not
on that account regard them as nullities. Had the case presented any grounds for supposing surprise, that would have afforded
some reason below for allowing the cause to stand open for further
proofs. But the party is bound to know what proof his adversary
takes at the time and place appointed, and, if not -seeing fit to
attend, he may still aicertain it at any time from the Commissioner .;
and the Court will always be liberal in relieving against accident or
surprise. In the- case before us there is no reason to believe any
surprise possible.- The testimony consists entirely of documents
set out- in the bill verbatim, and the proof of their execution
Under rule 56, the mortgage not being denied by the answers,
might have been read without being made an exhibit. Although
the bond does, not prove itself, yet, on being proved, any defence
to it must be affirmatively made out. No defence except the statute
of limitations is attempted to be made out by proof, and the stipulation extending time covers only the facts attending Barker's
purchase. There is no reason, therefore, why this evidence should
be disregarded. And, inasmuch as the case has been in this court
two years, without any motion to strike it out or have a new tran*
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script, we should not be disposed in a more doubtful case to permit
such laches. But the facts of record show that no injustice can be
done by retaining this proof.
It is claimed by defendant, Barker, that this mortgage is invalid
for want of certainty in the amount secured. As the complainants
do not seek to recover any advances made after Barker's purchase
(nor, indeed, any debts accruing after the date of the mortgage),
none of the questions in regard to intervening equities arise. The
only question presented is whether a mortgage to secure all debts
existing is good without specifying them. Upon a review of the
cases which were cited on the argument, we are satisfied that there
is no legal objection to such a mortgage. It affords a means of
ascertaining, by inquiry, the amount claimed to be due at any.
time. The objection that a limit of liability should appear is more
specious than sound. Such a limitation will always be made large
enough to cover' all contingencies, and leaves it still necessary to
make inquiries to learn the real amount secured. And, so far as
opportunities 'for fraud are concerned, such a maximum limit would
be quite as convenient a medium of deceit as an open mortgage.
As a matter of fact, even where mortgages have been given for
specific debts, inquiry is usually necessary to learn the balance unpaid; while mortgages of indemnity introduce not only uncertainty
in amount, but contingency of liability. And yet there is no respectable authority which vitiates these. Although upon the question raised in this case, there are some authorities sustaining the
defence, the general course of decision is so clearly the other way
that we are satisfied the mortgage must be held valid. We are of
opinion the law has been settled correctly, and that the su posed
evils of permitting such transactions are no greater than those which
attend very many other dealings of undoubted legality. We do
not, therefore, deem it necessary'to inquire into the good faith or
valuable consideration of defendant Barker's alleged purchase.
The defendants claim, however, that the mortgage is barred by
the statute of limitations. We do not think this ground is tenable.
The statute of limitations is confined to actions or suits to enforce
Dayment of the contract as a personal demand. Equity follows the
analogies of the law in all cases where an analogous relief is sought
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upon a similar claim. But where the relief sought is in its nature
one of equitable, and not of legal cognisance, and the remedy is
purely of an equitable nature, equity follows its own rules. The
foreclosure of mortgages is one of the ancient equitable remedies.
Its object is simply to enforce a lien upon lands by making it absolute unless redeemed. If there were any analogy between this and
any legal actions, it would apply to real, not personal actions.
But, in regard to mortgages, equity, although raising presumptions
from the lapse of time, has not made these presumptions conclusive.
And, in the present case, the time has not run long enough to raise
the presumption of payment, which, in such cases, requires a lapse
of twenty years. 1 Story Eq. Juris. § 64a, 529; 2 Story Eq. Juris.
§ 1028a, 1028b, 1519; 2 Pars. on Cont. 379. The rule fixing
such presumptions at twenty years was adopted, undoubtedly, in
accordance with the limitation of real actions in the common law.
courts, but it differs from that in not being an absolute bar to the
remedy. We think the complainants are entitled to foreclose their
mortgage.
The bill, under the statute, seeks a personal decree against Brown.
The power to grant such a decree is not one originally possessed by
courts of equity, but is purely statutory, and is given in order to
avoid circuity of action by a resort to a suit at law on the debt in
addition to a suit in equity to foreclose. It is therefore a mere
substitute for a legablaction, and must be governed by the rules
which would apply at law. The statute allows a personal decree
for the balance remaining unsatisfied after sale, "in the cases in
which such balance is recoverable at law." If barred at law it is
barred in equity.
The bond in the present suit was due more than ten years before
suit brought. Although payments are indorsed as made within ten
years, the statute expressly denies o such indorsements unexplained any weight as evidence of payment, for the purpose ot
charging the debtor by treating them as an acknowledgment so as
to take the case out of the operation of the law. 2 0. L. § 5377.
In the absence of other testimony, therefore, the statutory bar is
complete, and no decree can be made against Brown for the balance
which may remain unpaid.
V L. XIL-4

